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This paper examines the many changes which have transformed the German 
system of corporate governance during the last seven odd years. It concludes 
that it is in the process of converging towards the Anglo-American system  and 
that this has fundamentally affected the way strategic decisions are made in  
firms. Large, internationally oriented companies are particularly affected. But 
the notion of shareholder value and its many behavioural effects are gradually 
spreading also to other parts of the economy. Consequently, the distinctive 
logic, which had underpinned the German variety of capitalism during most of 
the post-war period, is eroding.  This transformation is affecting also labour and 
industrial relations in negative ways. The argument is empirically substantiated 
with data about recent trends in capital markets, banks and firms. 
 
The paper theoretically examines institutional change, focussing on the notions 
of system logic and institutional complementarity. It examines both external 
sources of change and internal powerful actors who promote the process of 
transformation. The notion of hybridisation of the German business system is 
examined but is rejected in favour of a trend towards convergence. Convergence 
is not seen as a functional necessity, nor is it viewed as inevitable. 
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Changes in Corporate Governance of German Corporations: Convergence 




After the collapse of state socialism in 1990, the focus of debate in the social 
sciences came to rest on differences within the capitalist world between 
different models of capitalist organisation. Just ten years on, the debate has 
shifted further, and there are now being voiced both triumphant claims and fears 
that one model of capitalism – that of competitive or liberal market capitalism - 
is displacing all others. The fundamental and long-established differences 
between what has come to be known as organised or co-ordinated market 
economies and competitive or liberal market economies are said to be in the 
process of erosion.  
 
This new debate has focused on changes in capital markets, corporate financing 
and their implications for corporate governance - institutions widely held to be 
cornerstones of models of capitalism (O’Sullivan 2000; Deeg 2001). Corporate 
governance may be loosely defined as all those rules and arrangements 
structuring the exercise of control over company assets and the pattern of 
interaction between different stakeholders within the firm.  Because forms of 
corporate governance are inherently connected with the allocation of power and 
resources and with a distribution of surplus they structure most other 
relationships within firms and the wider political economy, shaping its whole 
logic.  Hence, there is strong concern, particularly but not only on the part of 
labour, with the consequences of any processes of change for the redistribution 
of surplus and control to various stakeholders in the firm.  
 
Transformation of corporate governance in recent years has been most 
pronounced in coordinated market economies, and the impetus for and 
advocacy of change have come chiefly from the US (O’Sullivan  2000) and also 
from the UK. As Germany long has been portrayed as the paradigm case of 
coordinated  capitalism  (Deeg 2001), with many built-in institutional obstacles 
to erosion, debate around the German case is of particular interest.  If the 
hitherto very cohesive German system can be shown to be in the process of 
fundamental change, then other continental European business systems also are 
vulnerable.   
 
The processes of change which can be empirically observed have initiated a 
fresh debate on institutional transformation and how it might best be 
conceptualised. In particular, it is being debated whether the changes in 
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convergence, or whether they can be absorbed into the existing institutions of a 
coordinated market economy by processes of institutional adaptation and/or 
conversion (Thelen 2000). Four positions may be distinguished in this debate: 
an argument for system transformation and convergence; claims for system 
persistence, albeit with partial adjustment of the old model; and third, a 
diagnosis of the emergence of a hybrid model of capitalism. Partly overlapping 
with the third is a fourth position which posits functional conversion for one 
important institutional constellation within the German model.   
 
This paper seeks to further clarify the extent and exact nature of current 
transformations in the German system of corporate governance and political 
economy, as well as identify sources of change. I shall make the deeply 
contentious claim that convergence is, indeed, beginning to occur. Convergence 
has been variously defined, and in this paper it means one-sided adaptation of 
the ‘coordinated market economy’ model to that of the ‘liberal market 
economy’. It is being recognised that existing German institutions will mediate 
the impact of the ‘liberal market economy’ model . Hence it is not being 
envisaged that convergence will result in the creation of a German model, 
identical in all its features to Anglo-American capitalism. Nevertheless, the 
transformation of the underlying system logic is viewed as initiating 
fundamental and far-reaching changes in all institutional sub-systems. 
 
 My argument is not based on the functionalist assumption that convergence is 
occurring because ‘liberal market’ economies have shown themselves to 
perform in a superior way and that imitation by the less efficient is compelling. 
As Mary O’Sullivan has shown historical analysis of the evolution of systems of 
corporate governance and their impact on performance casts serious doubts on 
such claims. Hence I make no assumption that convergence is desirable and 
inevitable. On the contrary, it will be shown that convergence is connected with 
far-reaching consequences which will be highly negative for at least one 
important stakeholder – labour.  I shall suggest that it is reversible, if there is 
sufficient political will.  
 
The paper offers both an in-depth theoretical analysis and empirical 
substantiation of institutional change. To this purpose, it will provide first, a 
discussion of institutional change in general and convergence, in particular and, 
second, an outline and evaluation of changes in the German system of corporate 
governance, placing them in their broader institutional context.  
 
Change in patterns of corporate governance is a highly complex process, going 
far beyond changes in regulation of the capital market and the adoption of new 
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nature of transformation has to go further and deal with its multiple real 
consequences for various stakeholders at the level of the firm.  It cannot rely on 
the protestations of managers that they continue to have the interest of labour at 
heart but, instead, has to examine managerial behaviour, instigated by changes 
in corporate governance. Such a study has to deal with any fundamental 
changes in company strategy and structure and with the new configuration of 
intra-firm relations initiated by them.   
 
Evidence for such an in-depth assessment will be drawn from my own study of 
German companies in one important industry – chemicals/pharmaceuticals and 
from a range of secondary sources. Among the latter, I owe a particular debt to 
the excellent study by Steffen Becker (1999).(The industry is one of the most 
important in terms of its contribution to GDP and to R&D activity, and it also is 
a major employer). 
  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the theoretical framework 
adopted. It presents a brief outline of two models of corporate governance found 
in the literature . This is followed by a more sustained conceptualisation of the 
nature of institutional reproduction and change, with a special focus on the 
notions of institutional logic, coherence/complementarity and hybridisation. 
Section III, the empirical core of the paper, first introduces a brief historical 
sketch of the German model of corporate governance up to the mid-1990s to 
enable an assessment of change. This will be followed in section III.2 by an 
analysis of the changes in formal and informal institutional arrangements at the 
levels of both the financial system and of the firm. It evaluates the consequences 
of change for various corporate stakeholders, as well as their opportunities to 
influence the direction of change or mediate its impact. Section III.3 dwells on 
persistence of institutional arrangements at both levels and enduring divergence 
of the German model from the Anglo-American one. Section III.4 considers the 
balance of persistence and change and then critically examines claims about 
hybridisation of the German business system. In section III.5, it is concluded 
that the concept of convergence more aptly characterises emergent tendencies of 
change and that we may expect acceleration of the transformation process in the 
coming decades. The Conclusion debates the import of the findings offered in 
part III for the debate on convergence versus divergence, in the context of the 
theoretical understanding of institutional change detailed in section II. Finally, 
the paper draws out the consequences of convergence for the German variety of 
capitalism and the role of labour within it.  
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II.1 Approaches to corporate governance 
 
There are two major approaches to corporate governance. The first approach, 
current in mainstream economics, is only concerned with the relationship 
between financiers of firms – mainly shareholders and banks (principals) - and 
their agents (managers) and with formal and informal rules and procedures 
structuring it. The key goal of corporate governance here is to ensure a 
maximum return to investors. The development of a market for corporate 
control , through the threat of takeover, both structures the ex ante incentives of 
managers to fulfil this goal, as well as disciplining managers if they are under-
performing or diverting too large a share of net value to themselves. The second 
approach, more common outside economics, is the stakeholder approach which 
focuses on the entire network of formal and informal relations which determines 
how control is exercised within corporations and how the risks and returns are 
distributed between the various stakeholders. In addition to owners of capital 
and managers, employees are the most prominent. The principle embodied in 
this form of corporate governance is that companies should be required to serve 
a number of groups, rather than treat the interests of shareholders as overriding 
all others. The interests of labour here are foremost, and both their right to an 
equitable share of surplus and their entitlement to industrial participation are 
emphasised (e.g. Streeck 2001). .  
 
These two systems of corporate governance then may be mapped onto two 
different modes of exerting control (Mayer 2000). The first is equated with 
outsider and arms’ length control, connected with dispersed share ownership 
and the prevalence of institutional investors. The second notion, dwelling on the 
whole network of control, occurs when share ownership is more concentrated 
and owners of significant portions of ownership are able to exercise insider 
control. Concentrated holdings may be held by family owners, banks or other 
non-financial firms.  
 
In both types of systems, managerial performance is monitored and poorly 
performing managers are disciplined, but the way in which these two types of 
control are exercised differs decisively between outsider and insider control. In 
the insider system, control is exercised through board membership and legal 
rights of appointment and dismissal. It is said to be more direct and active, 
whereas in the outsider system control is indirect and exerted through the 
market for corporate control and the threat of take-over. Whereas the insider 
system is associated with management goals of stability and growth and longer-
term returns to significant owners, the outsider system implies the goals of 
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returns on capital invested.  
 
This paper starts by adopting the second notion of corporate governance which 
has been prevalent in Germany until the mid-1990s. I then proceed to 
investigate whether and to what degree it is giving way to the first type in 
current debates on this topic.  
 
 
II.2 Analysis of institutional persistence and change. 
 
Theoretical analyses of varieties of capitalism conducted during the last decade 
or so have differed in the degree to which they have systematically considered 
institutional change. Works published during the 1990s, such as Whitley 1992 
and 1999, Lane 1995; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, Berger and Dore 1997, 
Kitschelt et al 1999, and even Hall and Soskice 2001, have predominantly 
focused on institutional reproduction or persistence. In this, they have been 
influenced both by the notion of what constitutes system transformation and by 
an emphasis on system coherence (Whitley 1992 and Lane 1995) or 
interlocking complementarity of institutional ensembles (Hall and Soskice 
2001). Institutional complementarity is said to exist when the presence or 
absence of one institution affects the efficiency of the other (Hall and Soskice 
2001: 16), and the link between institutional complexes are specific incentive 
structures. These are seen to inhibit radical or fundamental socio-economic 
change and instead promote institutional reproduction.   
 
Both the notion of institutional coherence and of institutional complementarity 
are derived from the assumption that there is an institutional logic expressed in 
concrete practices and organisational arrangements which influences what 
social roles, relationships  and strategies are conceivable, efficacious and 
legitimate (Biggart and Guillen 1999: 725). Additionally, organising  logics are 
held to be ‘repositories of distinctive capabilities  that allow firms ….to pursue 
some activities in the global economy more successfully than others’ (Biggart 
and Guillen 1999). The relationships and roles researched in the empirical part 
of their paper centres on relationships of control and identifies the categories of 
actors favoured by them in a number of political economies.  Biggart and 
Guillen’s sociological institutionalism views institutional logics as sense-
making constructs and focuses on taken-for granted organisational 
arrangements.  Hall and Soskice 2001, in contrast, committed to a ‘rational 
actor’ institutionalist perspective, are concerned above all with  incentive   
structures and efficiency goals.   Both these approaches, envisaging a system 
logic, internal coherence/complementarity and system reproduction have 
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therefore implied that only extreme external shocks are able to effect system 
transformation. Although change is not ruled out entirely, ‘within system’ 
incremental change has been theoretically privileged.    
 
More recently, in the face of empirically observable, wide-ranging  change in 
core institutional arrangements, analysts have begun to question three 
interconnected assumptions of the above approaches: 1. That system change 
necessarily has to be of the radical big-bang nature: 2. that it can be brought 
about only by external shocks (Mahoney 2001; Deeg 2001; Thelen 2000); and 
3. whether  institutional complementarity really is as strong as believed by the 
earlier approaches, or whether discrete institutions may change independently 
from the rest (Thelen 2000; Lane 2000; Becker 2001; Deeg 2001; Hoepner   
2001; Vitols, 2001; Streeck 2001; Beyer and Hassel 2002; Morgan and Kubo 
2002).  These writers implicitly or explicitly dwell instead on more evolutionary 
and cumulative change. They place great importance also on the influence of 
internal actors in bringing about radical change. Most important, they do not 
assume system coherence but posit hybridisation of systems, or  identify buffers 
which prevent change in one part of the system, affecting other parts (Morgan 
and Kubo 2001). Although these recent critics have elaborated a much more 
sophisticated and valid notion of institutional change they do not go far enough 
and mistake a temporary phenomenon for the final outcome. Hence they are 
unable to do full justice to an understanding of  processes of change currently 
observable in coordinated market economies.  
 
This paper will further explore some of the assumptions underlying both sets of 
arguments and, in doing so, adopt an institutionalist approach, combining 
elements of the ‘rational actor’ and the more sociological variant of New 
Institutionalism. It will agree with more recent analysts that transformation can 
result from cumulative change and that a consideration of internal actors is vital 
when trying to understand the process of change. I also accept their claim that 
institutional ensembles may change independently from each other and that, for 
a short time, systems may contain opposed logics. At the same time, I agree 
with Biggart and Guillen 1999; Whitley (1999) and Hall and Soskice  (2001) 
that there is an inherent strain for system coherence or complementarity, based 
on an underlying institutional logic, which cannot be disrupted in the longer run 
if the system is to prosper. In contrast to the second set of analysts, the paper 
therefore concludes that hybridisation can only be unstable and temporary. Top 
managers cannot make strategic decisions based on a market logic in one arena 
and resort to an opposed logic in another arena of decision-making. Instead, it 
will be argued that, in the longer term, we must expect either a return to the old 
path or the adoption of a new one. As adoption of an entirely new path rarely 
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more likely outcome. I will provide evidence that the general movement is 
towards convergence, as well as a careful specification of what the concept does 
and does not entail.   
 
Two further issues need to be dealt with. First, how does one know whether 
institutional innovation, resulting from evolutionary and cumulative change,  is 
within-system or bounded change or whether it has led to the adoption of a new 
path and a more fundamental system change. How does one distinguish one 
type of change from another? System change has occurred when a new logic 
has replaced the old one, i.e. when it is accepted by most influential actors in the 
political economy. It is being assumed that the system of corporate governance, 
which defines relations of control within firms, as well as pinpointing the main 
stakeholders, is crucial to the definition of the institutional logic linking all parts 
of the system.  
 
Second, how does system change differ from hybridisation?  Hybridisation 
usually implies that complementarity  no longer exists and that different parts of 
the system are dominated by different logics. Thus, to illustrate, the logic of the 
liberal market economy may be accepted by actors in the capital market and in 
large listed firms, but not by unlisted large companies or by small and medium-
sized firms and their banks (Deeg 2001).  Or, alternatively, the new logic may 
dictate strategy in product markets but not in firm-internal systems of co-
determination (Hoepner and Jackson 2001).  
 
To sum up this section, it has been argued that transformation of core 
institutional arrangements of the German political economy has been more 
striking than reproduction and that it is necessary to arrive at a theoretical 
understanding of this momentous process. It has been suggested that 
hybridisation  generally is an unstable temporary phenomenon.  If a cumulative 
change in a central institution, i.e. the financial system, has fundamentally 
changed the logic which governs relations within that system, and is supported 
by powerful actors both within firms and the political system, hybridisation 
does not usually endure. The power and/or legitimacy of internal champions of 
change will lead to a spill-over into other parts of the system, even into those 
more remote from the stock market. Complementarity eventually will be 
restored. Hybridisation, however, may be more enduring if it is supported by 
some powerful internal actors and effective buffers between different spheres of 
the economy are erected (see Morgan and Kubo 2002 on Japan). These 
theoretical claims will be substantiated in the empirical part of this paper 
focussing on contemporary changes  in the system of corporate  governance ( 
Part III.2 to III.4). First though a short description of the German system of 
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will be outlined. This will identify the institutional logic and coherence of that 
system, as well as provide a base line against which more recent transformation 
may be assessed.  
 
 
III Review of Empirical Evidence 
 
III.1 Historical sketch of the German financial system and form of 
corporate governance. 
 
Throughout the post-war period, until the mid-1990s, the German financial 
system and mode of corporate governance showed a high degree of stability, 
distinguishing it, for example, from the French system (Morin 2000). It has 
often been described as being diametrically opposed to the system of outsider 
control, prevalent in Britain (Lane 1992 and 1995; Mayer 2000; Heinze 2001) 
and in the US (O’Sullivan 2000). 
 
Among sources of capital for German firms, retained earnings has been the 
most significant, leaving firms highly autonomous (Deutsche Bundesbank 1997: 
37, quoted by Becker, p. 31). Bank debt was low, and issuing of shares through 
listing on the stock market was common only among a small proportion of the 
largest firms. Due to a number of reasons, the stock market remained 
underdeveloped and insignificant both for domestic and foreign investors. 
Hence stock market capitalisation has been low in comparison with Britain, the 
US and even Japan. Thus, during the period of 1982 to 1991, stock market 
capitalisation stood at only 20 per cent of GDP, compared with 75 per cent in 
the UK (Mayer 2000: 1). Ownership in German firms has been relatively 
concentrated, and family ownership is still significant even in some very large 
firms. Cross ownership of non-financial firms has been more pronounced and 
interlocking  directorships have been highly developed (Windolf  2002). For all 
these reasons, hostile take-over was almost unknown. Although historically 
banks have been important insiders in German firms, occupying a high 
proportion of seats on supervisory boards, their ownership stakes during recent 
decades have not been high. Their importance as insider controllers has been 
upheld primarily by their ability to cast proxy votes on behalf of the many 
smaller investors whose shares they administer. Important rights of control have 
been vested in the supervisory board, which is independent from the 
management board and on which seats are held in varying proportions by 
representatives of owners and of employees. Relatively effective employee co-
determination has been a distinctive feature of the system of  governance.  
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stakeholders.  Hence top managers in this system are said to be less autonomous 
than their British counterparts (Vitols et al 1997), being more accountable to 
both large owners, banks, employees and even the local community. Decision-
making is more consensus-oriented and may even be described as more 
collective.  
 
There has, however, been a relatively low constraint to deliver very high returns 
to shareholders, and instead stability of the firm, market growth, together with 
adequate profits, have been management goals. Managers usually made their 
career in a given industry and advanced to top positions within the internal 
labour market. These circumstances have enabled managers to pursue strategies, 
oriented towards longer-term returns, and this orientation has shaped the 
German practice of skill development and the production paradigm of 
diversified quality production. Employees possess legally guaranteed rights of 
control, and they have exercised them to safeguard their skills, their 
employment security and an equitable distribution of surplus between various 
stakeholders. The pay gap between top managerial staff and other employees 
has been far less pronounced than, for example, in Britain and the USA (Crouch 
and Streeck 1997). The other side of the coin is that financial control of 
organisational subunits has been relatively lax, financial transparency of 
companies low, and small investors have had no means to safeguard adequate 
returns on their investment.  
 
The underlying logic, informing all parts of the German political economy, has 
been shaped by a network type of control, aiming for stability and growth, 
rather than short-term high returns on investment.  This network has included 
employees as important stakeholders in the firm, entitled to a fair share of 
surplus and to co-decision-making in areas directly affecting their current and 
future well-being.  
 
III.2 Recent institutional changes in the German capital market and system 
of corporate governance. 
 
III.2.1 Sources of change 
 
This network system of corporate governance has begun to change during the 
second half of the 1990s. The external impetus for change has come from three 
main sources. There usually is considerable interdependence between them, but 
each source of change also can be effective in isolation.  Many analyses of 
changes in the German model of capitalism have focused only on the 
transformation of the capital markets (e.g Heinze 2001) or deny the marked 
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markets (e.g.Beyer and Hassel 2002: 12). Only a consideration of all three 
sources and a recognition of their mutually reinforcing impact, however, is able 
to capture the full force for change.  
  
The first source of change has been liberalization of international capital 
markets and the greater readiness of hitherto ‘national’ capital to seek out the 
most profitable opportunities for both accessing and investing capital wherever 
this may be in the world. This has entailed the modernisation of capital markets 
in continental Europe and the spread of the Anglo-American model of 
organising them, as well as the greater participation of firms from coordinated  
market economies in the stock markets of liberal market economies. . The 
impact of the US/UK model of organising capital markets has entailed an 
introduction of new actors to those markets - foreign investment funds - and has 
established enhanced legitimacy for and wide acceptance of  their primary goal 
– improved shareholder value. This, in turn, has put pressures on listed firms to 
restructure their operations in line with fund managers’ expectations, 
particularly to increase financial transparency. A prominent aspect of this is a 
demand  for reduction of product diversity and for concentration on what is 
considered core business.  Failure to de-diversify is sanctioned by the so-called 
conglomerate discount on the share prices of non-compliant firms. Greater 
pressure for enhanced profits and dividends has forced managers to turn 
previously integrated organisational sub-units into independent profit centres. 
Capital market actors thus clearly have introduced the logic of the market into 
firms and have been able to influence managers’ strategic decision-making. 
 
Intensified competition in product markets has been the second source of 
change. Greater competitive pressure has made it important to attain sufficient 
size and market influence to prevail against international competitors and thus 
has exerted pressure for capital concentration, through merger and acquisition. 
This, in turn, may precipitate listing on stock markets. (An example is the 
Merck KgaA pharmaceutical company which, although in majority family 
ownership, listed a proportion of its shares in 19996). Competitiveness on 
international markets also has been shaped by product innovation. The much 
increased speed of innovation and the greatly enhanced cost of research and 
development to achieve it, have created further pressures for capital 
concentration and reliance on the stock market to achieve it.  
 
A third source of change in corporate governance has been the development of 
new cultural and/or ideological orientations, shaped by three processes of 
cultural diffusion. Here the reference is to the concept of shareholder value and 
associated motivations, cognitions and scenarios for action. These have been 
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origin. They also have been absorbed through participation in new programmes 
of management education, particularly the MBA, and, last, during extended 
spells of direct exposure to Anglo-American business environments when 
managing German subsidiaries in these two countries. The management practice 
of measuring performance through application of precise financial indicators, 
fundamental to the concept of shareholder value, has become widely adopted by 
and legitimate among higher German managers (Becker 2001). They are 
regarded as modern management approaches, the adoption of which enhances 
managerial reputation.    
 
All these external pressures, it will be shown below, have not simply been 
imposed on unwilling financial and non-financial firms. Core and powerful 
economic actors have begun to identify their own interests with those of capital 
market actors and to actively promote internal change. Political actors have 
given them important legislative support and have not stepped in to prevent 
hostile take-over, as became evident in the recent takeover of Mannesmann by 
Vodafone. (For details, see Hoepner and Jackson 2001). However, the current 
and previous social democratic governments have been sending out conflicting 
messages. The new Takeover Law, in force since 1 January 2002, permits the 
target management to put in place anti-takeover defences, provided these have 
either received support from 75 per cent of shareholders or have been authorised 
in advance by the supervisory board (Deakin et al 2002). The government also 
has adopted a very pro-labour stance on the issue of labour market reform, 
insisting that reforms can only be introduced in a consensual manner. There is 
as yet no indication as to how these conflicting stances are to be reconciled.   
 
III.2.2 Changes in capital markets 
 
Wide-ranging changes in German capital markets have been effected by both 
important market actors and by government changes in legislation. A long list 
of changes from the mid 1990s onwards (for an exhaustive list, see Hoepner 
2001) by 1998 had led to the modernization of the organisation and regulation 
of the German stock market  and to the establishment of a centralised capital 
market on the US/UK model.  Particularly significant steps were: the weakening 
of the regional decentralization of stock markets and the creation of a unified 
market in Frankfurt, to become the privatised Deutsche Boerse;  the creation, in 
1994,  of a federal authority for market supervision;  the establishment of legal 
rules and conventions, creating greater transparency in firm structures and 
actions; safeguarding of the rights of minority owners; the removal of hurdles to 
hostile takeover; the creation of the  initially successful Neuer Markt for 
smaller, technology-intensive firms, which caused a wider diffusion and 
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investors; and some curtailment of banks’ influence on company supervisory 
boards through some limitation of the rule on proxy voting and the number of 
chairmanships individual bankers can hold. 
 
Other government legislation fuelled the expansion and influence of the stock 
market on firms. Among these were the authorisation of stock options as part of 
managers’ reward package, in order to realign incentives; the legalisation of 
share buy-back; the introduction of a semi-voluntary company code to 
encourage greater transparency and accountability of firms to investors.  
 
The most far-reaching piece of legislation, however, passed in 2000 and to be 
implemented in 2002, is the exemption from tax payments of gains from sales 
of blocks of shares, previously tied up in cross holdings. It is expected that this 
law, encouraging investors’ withdrawal from long-term share-holdings in 
under-performing companies, will unravel the German system of cross 
shareholding.  It  is likely to dissolve the large block holdings and destroy the 
network character of corporate control. This, in turn, will constrain companies 
to become more reliant on stock markets.  The greater dispersion of holdings 
then will provide investment opportunities for outsiders, thus making firms 
more vulnerable to takeovers. As non-financial firms are the most significant 
owners of other non-financial firms this would knock out the basis of the 
current German system of insider control and put into question the long-
termism that patient capital has permitted.  
 
All these measures also have changed the role of banks, both in capital markets 
and within firms. Banks have begun to recognise that their business in large 
firms had been diminishing (Becker 2001; Deeg 2001) and, simultaneously, that 
more money could be made in underwriting  and the lucrative market for 
company buying and selling. Deutsche Bank has led the way in transforming 
itself and entering investment banking on the Anglo-American model, and 
several other banks have since followed this move. Banks’ partial 
disengagement from insider control is evident in their reduced representation on 
company supervisory boards (Luetz 2000) and, more dramatically from a 
significant surrender of chairmanships. Thus, between 1992 and 1999, banks’ 
share of chairmanships fell from 44 to 23  per cent in the largest forty 
companies (Hoepner 2001: ). They now have slightly less control over proxy 
votes  (Deeg 2001). Together, these developments indicate their reduced 
willingness and capacity for insider monitoring. Deutsche Bank and Allianz – 
between them the most significant owners of large listed companies - have 
made it clear that they intend to restructure their holdings in accordance with 
profit levels (Heinze 2001). Many banks already put greater emphasis on short- 
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portfolio (Becker 2001: 316). 
 
III.2.3 Changes within firms 
 
The number of companies listed on the stock market has increased very slightly 
as has listing on foreign markets, and the proportion of shares owned by foreign 
institutional investors increased from 4 per cent in 1990 to 13 per cent in 1998 
(Deeg 2001: 27, footnote 39). Also the degree of dispersion of share ownership 
has risen slightly. Those companies already quoted undertook a number of 
changes, significantly affecting  corporate governance, organisational structures 
and strategies and the relations with other stakeholders. However, the number 
listed has remained small and of those quoted, only a minority – around 10 per 
cent – significantly changed their ownership structure and became exposed to 
takeover (Heinze 2001). A market for corporate control, it is widely agreed, has 
not yet developed. But the market is nevertheless shaping many managers’ 
expectations  and interests, and external monitoring of listed companies is 
prevalent. Together, these are sufficient to have exerted a significant effect  on 
internal strategic decision-making. Many companies not exposed to shareholder 
pressures have adopted elements of the notion of shareholder value to legitimate 
restructuring and a greater performance orientation. Even firms still in 
substantial or total family ownership, such as Boehringer Ingelheim and Merck 
KGaA, now work with financial indicators and targets, as well as using 
managerial incentives, normally found only in listed and/or widely held 
companies.  
 
Hence the influence of the stock market on managerial attitudes, goals and 
strategies of chemical/pharmaceutical companies has been pervasive, affecting 
both listed and unlisted internationally oriented companies. Although there is 
little evidence that investment funds are exerting strong direct external control 
over managers, the indirect influence of the stock market, via the movement of 
share prices, has been considerable. The listed companies are now more subject 
to external monitoring and have responded to such monitoring to varying 
degrees.  This is evident not only in a greater cultivation of investor relations, 
the adoption of international accounting standards and the issuing of  quarterly 
reports (Beyer and Hassel 2001). It is additionally expressed in more 
fundamental changes of strategy and structure, relating to enterprise goals, such 
as mode of growth, selection of product portfolio, incentive structures and 
system of payment (Becker 2001; Hoepner 2001). The following examples from 
one industry will illustrate what I believe to be a more general trend.  
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have had to dilute owner control and become listed to raise the additional 
capital needed for expansion ( e.g. Merck KGaA and Fresenius) or to swap 
shares in mergers. Concern with the movement of company share price then  
motivates managers to introduce various strategy changes,  welcomed and 
rewarded by capital market actors.  Some or all of the following changes in 
strategy have been implemented by companies in the chemical/pharmaceutical 
industry: introduction of sometimes ambitious targets for growth in turnover 
and profits (most large companies in the industry); changes in organisational 
structure to enable better control of performance by both top managements and 
capital market actors, as well as to facilitate listing of organisational sub-units 
(Hoechst, Bayer and Fresenius); introduction of share options or equivalent 
schemes to align managerial incentives with those of investors (all major 
companies in the industry);  introduction of  reward systems for employees, tied 
to the company’s or business unit’s performance (all large companies in the 
industry); some reduction of product diversity to enhance transparency and a 
greater shift to the more profitable pharmaceuticals segment (executed most 
consequentially by Hoechst/Aventis and more hesitantly by most of the other 
companies) (Company Annual Reports 2001/02; Becker 2001).  
 
Unlisted firms and those still substantially under family control have responded 
to a lesser degree. But they nevertheless have been compelled to make partial 
adjustments as they operate in the same competitive environment as the 
companies, exposed to stock market control. Some also have found it 
convenient to refer to shareholder value notions to push through measures to 
enhance employee performance or to justify restructuring and job cutting. Thus 
Boehringer Ingelheim, still wholly family-owned, nevertheless has introduced 
changes in organisational structure which force managers to take more 
responsibility for their unit’s performance and has introduced ‘shareholder 
value’ indicators for purposes of internal control. Additionally, the company has 
introduced a functional equivalent to a share option scheme, in order to attract 
and retain high calibre top managers (Becker 2001: 299). Merck KgaA,   
although over 70 per cent family-owned, has introduced  share options for the 
same reason (ibid: 310). 
 
Many of the younger managers, often with US training or experience , in any 
case are less committed to the German company structure and culture. Financial 
and business specialists are now more likely to be selected for promotion to 
management boards (Hoepner 2001; Baecker 2001), necessarily causing partial 
displacement of the traditionally strongly entrenched production-oriented   
engineers.  (The radical restructuring of Hoechst, for example, in line with 
shareholder demands, was master-minded by just such a financial specialist – 
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similar to those of their Anglo-American counterparts, as evidenced in the 
dramatic decline in the average time in post during the 1990s (Hoepner 2001) – 
a feature more conducive to adopting a strong stance on raising short-term 
profitability. More generally, the new generation of German top managers 
recognises the importance of financial indicators and targets as bases for 
strategic  decision-making (Becker 2001: 274). In sum, important aspects of 
managerial strategies have been decisively shaped by changes in corporate 
governance, even if there is still resistance on some aspects and different firms 
have adapted at different speeds and to different degrees.  
 
All these changes in strategy, structure and reward systems have impacted on 
employees and on organised labour, i.e. company co-determination systems and 
industrial relations at industry level. Negative repercussions for employee 
stakeholders have been various. The famed German employment security has 
been eroded in some large shareholder value companies. Selling off or closing 
of sub-units and large-scale job cutting have become prevalent. Such firms now 
spend a higher share  of net value generated on dividends and a lower 
proportion on labour (Beyer and Hassel 2002: 15, reporting on a survey of the 
59 largest German companies). They have not reduced spending on labour but 
have cut the level of  employment and thus have intensified labour for 
remaining employees (ibid). In ‘shareholder value’ companies, a greater 
proportion of employees’ pay is now variable (Kurdelbusch 2001), creating 
further insecurity, as well as undermining labour solidarity.  Company-wide 
representation and the solidarity it affords have been weakened by linking pay 
more strongly to performance of individual company sub-units.  A much 
increased focus by employees on the profitability and survival of their 
employing company also has made employee representatives less willing to 
cooperate with unions to achieve wider industry goals (Hoepner 2001: 27). At 
the same time, labour has not been fundamentally opposed to the imposition of 
shareholder value, and it has even seen some of the new developments, such as 
greater company financial transparency, as being very much in its own interest 
(ibid). Hence organised labour, particularly at the company level, appears to be 
coopted into a more neo-liberal model.  
 
III. 3   Persistence of the German model 
 
 The story told so far has provided a one-sided picture. Many features of the old 
system of corporate governance persist, and convergence to and divergence 
from the Anglo-American model exist side by side in a complex mixture. An 
assessment of the degree of persistence has to bear in mind, however, that 
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late 1990s. 
 
The most glaring example of persistence of the old financial system is that 
German firms have not been rushing to become listed, and the German stock 
market, in comparative perspective, remains strongly undercapitalised. Hence 
only the large flagship companies, and not all of those, are subject to stock 
market pressure, and family ownership of even very large companies persists. 
Companies become listed much later in their life cycle and at a much higher 
size threshold than in the UK (Mayer 2000: 1). Individual shareholding, 
although increased, remains low by international standards and thus retards the 
development of a shareholder psychology. Recent adverse developments in the 
capital markets, particularly the collapse of the Neuer Markt, have called forth a 
renewed scepticism about financial markets.   
 
Among listed companies, ownership concentration, sustained often by cross 
ownership of shares,  remains significant. Average size of voting blocks of 
nearly 50 per cent may be opposed to blocks of less than ten per cent for UK 
companies (Mayer 2000: 2). This continues to obstruct the development of an 
outsider system of control and of a market for corporate control. The influence 
of foreign investment funds – the most insistent claimants for shareholder value 
- has been significant  in only a small proportion of cases – about ten per cent of 
large listed companies. 
 
Also there has been no change in company law, and the system of 
codetermination is still intact. Employee stakeholders still retain some degree of 
influence, if not control, within the enterprise, even if intensified competition 
often makes it difficult to voice their demands. The two-tier board, designed for 
insider control, also remains in place.  
 
III.4 Balance of change and persistence: hybridisation?  
 
The discussion under III.2 has shown that the German system of corporate 
governance has experienced  far-reaching change in its underlying logic, 
indicating significant convergence with the Anglo-American system. But, at the 
same time, it shows stubborn resistance to change on some central features of 
corporate governance. Most analysts nevertheless agree that the German 
financial system of corporate governance has converged to the Anglo-American 
model, but they do not wish to go as far as positing convergence for the whole 
political economy or variety of capitalism. Instead, these analysts are suggesting 
that other institutional configurations are persisting or merely are adapting in 
incremental ways. Hence these scholars prefer to conceptualise current 
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2001; Beyer and Hassel 2002) or, more obscurely, posit the occurrence of   
hybrid convergence (Hoepner 2001). Such conclusions capture important 
aspects of the process of institutional transformation at the beginning of the 21
st 
century. One important variant of the hybridisation thesis is that radical 
transformation in one institutional configuration calls forth adaptive functional  
conversion in other parts of the political economy. Such conversion, according 
to Thelen (2000: 105), occurs when exogenous shocks empower new actors 
who harness existing organisational forms in the service of  new ends. 
Diagnoses of hybridisation have taken different forms, and three different 
arguments in support of hybridisation  will be examined critically in the 
following. They will be analysed  both for their  internal theoretical coherence 
and for their plausibility in the light of empirical developments.  
 
For some of these authors, advocacy of hybridisation is based on the belief that 
the great internal diversity of the German economy creates highly diverse 
contingencies for firms and hence, despite some common pressures, precludes 
convergent development (Deeg 2001; Vitols 2001; Becker 2001). The focus is 
particularly on diversity in terms of sector, size and type of firm, as well as 
degree of exposure to global pressures. A second argument advanced against 
convergence points to diversity in managerial perceptions, cognitive focal 
points and evaluations of contingent circumstances, regarded as at least in part 
endogenous to the institutions which govern managerial actors’ rationality. 
This, in turn, is deemed to preserve diversity in strategy and hence in forms of 
corporate governance and other institutional constellations (Becker 2001).   A 
third variant of the hybridisation thesis is that  the system of codetermination 
and democratic participation of labour is both so well entrenched and of such 
centrality  to the German production paradigm of diversified quality production 
that management will find a way to combine the logic of the capital market with 
the logic of an employee stakeholder system (Hoepner 2001; Hoepner and 
Jackson 2001; Streeck 2001; Beyer and Hassel 2002). Evoking Thelen’s (2000) 
concept of functional conversion, it is being suggested (Hoepner 2001) that 
institutionalised practices of co-determination have become transformed, in 
order to re-establish complementarity with the system of corporate governance. 
In the process, they have changed from being an institutional structure to 
negotiate on issues of a  ‘class’ type to one mainly supporting the company goal 
of enhanced efficiency.   
 
How persuasive are these various hybridisation theses?  Becker (2001) and 
Vitols (2001), in support of the first hybridisation thesis, cite the differing 
product strategies, organisational forms and cultures of large companies even in 
the same industry – chemical/ pharmaceutical – and contrast what they see as 
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argument about diversity between firms, in my view, underestimates the 
pressure for isomorphic adaptation which emanates from the business press and 
the example of the large flagship companies. Additionally, it wrongly suggests 
that transformation of the German political economy could only occur if all 
economic actors were to adopt the ‘shareholder value’ model to the same 
degree.   
 
A close analysis of recent developments of the three chemical/pharmaceutical 
giants, however, shows that Hoechst was merely the first to choose a strategy of 
de-diversification and radical organisational and legal restructuring in 1996/97.  
Bayer and BASF, although originally much more wedded to the retention of a 
diverse product portfolio and a traditional integrated organisational structure, 
have begun to embark on a similar, albeit still less radical path. Bayer retains 
chemicals for the time being, but the proportion of pharmaceuticals in the 
portfolio is being systematically increased. In 2002, the company began to 
restructure itself into a holding company, with legally independent subsidiaries 
– a pattern highly reminiscent of the Hoechst model. The push to proceed in this 
way clearly came from the capital market. According to the company’s web 
site, this new structure gives greater transparency for internal resource 
allocation, for the capital market and for stockholders (Bayer web site, 
13.8.2002).  It may well be a preparation for the planned acquisition of 
pharmaceutical companies, to further increase the focus on this business area, 
favoured by the capital market. Both Bayer and Hoechst/Aventis, on Hoepner’s 
index of shareholder value orientation, are ranked very highly, and Bayer even 
tops  Hoechst/Aventis in the ranking list  It is only in the area of gaining focus 
on core competences that the Bayer has moved more slowly.  BASF, too, has 
sought to gain more focus, albeit in a different direction from Hoechst. In 2000, 
it shed its business in pharmaceuticals to concentrate on chemicals. (Its 
subsidiary Knoll, which had the largest part of the pharmaceutical operations, 
was sold to Abbott Laboratories). Thus, the three companies have not adopted 
identical strategies, but they are clearly changing in the same direction, albeit at 
different speeds. 
 
  Most other large German chemical/pharmaceutical companies have been 
engaged in  strategic and organisational adjustments oriented towards capital 
market actors. Some have engaged in organisational restructuring affording 
greater internal and external transparency, others have down-graded 
geographical divisions (Landesgesellschaften) in favour of product-based 
business units. All have become more performance-oriented and have set 
relatively high profit targets to signal to capital market actors that they are 
concerned to raise shareholder value. According to Becker (2001), ‘in all 
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controlling, closely allied to centralisation of strategic management and the 
granting of operational independence to operative units, all allied to the use of 
performance indicators and targets as bases for decision-making (ibid: 273-74).  
It is only in the area of greater focus on core competences that most German 
chemical-pharmaceutical companies have stalled and are holding on to a more 
diversified product portfolio for reasons of risk distribution.  
 
Nor is diversity as pronounced when we move to other industries or descend in 
the size scale of firms. Although the pharmaceutical industry is among the most 
highly internationalised ones there now exists hardly any industry sheltered 
from competitive pressures in international markets for capital and goods and 
services. Even industries with a low export propensity are exposed to 
international pressures from inward investors and, if listed, are not immune 
from takeover. The studies by Hoepner (2001) and Zugehoer (2001) well 
illustrate that the shareholder value orientation is prevalent also in other 
industries.  
 
Furthermore, competitive pressures affect both large and medium-sized firms, 
albeit to different degrees. Firms in both size classes have to find funds to 
increase their size or to increase investment in R&D, in order to stay ahead in 
the international competitive race. Nor are smaller firms totally exempt from 
pressures as large firms have to pass on cost pressures to their smaller suppliers. 
The existence, until recently, of the Neuer Markt, too, has familiarised smaller 
firms with market practices and values. Pressures on non-commercial savings 
banks to become more profit-oriented, too, in the longer run will force them to 
pass these on to their SME clients, especially after the planned demise of the 
privileges currently still enjoyed by savings banks (Lane and Quack 2000)..  
 
Turning to the second argument, managers do indeed differ in the extent to 
which they acknowledge and accept the new pressures for greater transparency 
and shareholder value. But their perceptions, interests and motivations have 
been changing, together with the changing institutions and business culture.   
They are increasingly being shaped by the ideology of shareholder value. 
Associated goals and practices, such as monitoring profitability with numerical 
targets, are not seen in ideological terms, but as being part of modern 
management practice, likely to raise reputation. Hence some managers have 
embraced the new ideology with alacrity as, for example, the chief executive of 
Hoechst, others have done so more partially (the previous CEO of Bayer) or 
more reluctantly (the previous CEO of Merck) when the adverse consequences 
of non-compliance for stock price became obvious. In 2000, the Aventis share 
surpassed that of Bayer in value by nearly 100 per cent although Bayer had 
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1990s. But it was being punished by the so-called conglomerate discount, 
whereas Hoechst/Aventis was rewarded for conforming to all demands of 
capital market actors (Becker 2001: 137-140, 145).  Merck’s chief executive – a 
member of one of the owning families - publicly railed against stock market 
actors’ demands and tried to pursue a strategy of maximum stability of earnings 
for the owning families. Merck’s share price, despite good overall performance, 
consequently did poorly. This chief executive has now been replaced by a more 
compliant professional manager, and the share price has risen accordingly 
(ibid). The new pressures for enhanced performance and more transparent 
organisation, exerted on managers of large listed companies, have to be passed 
on to both their subordinates and their business partners and thus gradually will 
diffuse throughout  the economy. 
 
The claim by Hoepner and Jackson (2001) that ‘shareholder value and co-
determination do get along fine’ exemplifies one position among the third set of 
arguments for hybridisation. The authors are referring to the fact that many 
works councils have undergone functional conversion and are now seeing their 
main function as supporting management goals of enhancing efficiency and 
competitiveness (ibid). The argument by Hoepner and Jackson (2001) that this 
institution is persisting, despite the changed logic of the system of corporate 
governance, does not convince. The goals of co-determination, it is true, 
therefore are no longer in opposition to those of corporate governance, but the 
reverse relation does not hold. Adherence to the shareholder value principle by 
management means putting investors first, and many of the activities 
undertaken to satisfy investors go counter to employees’ interests, as already 
detailed in section III.2. What persists is only an institutional shell, emptied of 
all the old ideological content which allowed bodies of codetermination to 
execute checks on and  provide a counterweight to the power of capital.  The 
collapse of any real chances for co-determination and its substitution with a co-
management stance would be better described by the term ‘loss of function’, 
than by the grand label of ‘functional conversion’.  
 
Up to now, the system of co-determination and the stakeholder company have, 
indeed, been deeply entrenched in contemporary German political culture, and it 
has appeared unlikely that any government would change the co-determination 
laws. But it now appears that the institution is no longer sacrosanct. The 
Commission which drafted the new corporate governance code  is planning to 
introduce a new measure, designed to weaken the system of co-determination.   
This would permit companies which have more than half their employees 
overseas to opt out of being bound by co-determination (Financial Times, 8. 
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easily achieve this ‘overseas’ employment target.   
 
Even if such legal change were not to occur, the institution of co-determination 
already has been weakened from within.  There no longer exists a link between 
the incentive structure underpinning corporate governance and that shaping 
industrial and labour relations. If the whole logic of the system of corporate 
governance has left or is in the process of leaving the path of  stakeholder 
capitalism, then the continued existence of an empty institutional shell will not 
stand in the way of convergence.  
 
A stronger argument in favour of a hybrid outsider/insider system of control is 
advanced by Streeck (2001) and Beyer and Hassel (2002). Echoing the view of 
Biggart and Guillen (19991) that a certain system logic ‘breeds’ certain 
capabilities, conducive to cultivation of particular market niches, they  rightly 
point to the indispensability to the German production paradigm of high levels 
of human capital development and consensual decision-making.  They further 
strengthen their claims by pointing to empirical evidence that, to date, wage 
levels have not fallen and commitment to a high-skill economy has not 
noticeably weakened.  
 
Beyer and Hassel (2002) further claim that investors have not shown themselves 
opposed to the expensive training system and may recognise that this system 
enables German firms to deliver higher value. They therefore conclude that 
institutional investors might be willing to forego short-term profit maximisation 
in favour of longer-term gains. Beyer and Hassel (2002) thus are citing the 
arguments of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ and refer to the professed 
willingness of some fund managers to support the ‘high road’ to simultaneous 
gain both for shareholders and other stakeholders. But unfortunately, at the time 
of writing, these professed enlightened goals hardly have been put to the test. 
Research done in the UK on implicit contracts in the negotiation of takeover 
conditions established that, though legal and regulatory provisions permit 
directors to temper the pursuit of shareholders’ interests with those of 
employees, in a situation of conflict of interests shareholders’ short-term 
financial interests  usually prevailed over those of  employees (Deakin et al 
2002: 14, 24).   
 
Furthermore, although many managers and policy makers will no doubt wish to 
preserve the venerable paradigm of ‘diversified quality production’, powerful 
constraints for profit maximisation will make this a much more problematic 
endeavour than is recognised by Beyer and Hassel (2002). Their argument 
attributes more subtle behaviour to investors than is possible in an arms’ length 
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to guarantee the highest returns. Furthermore, their assumption that patience by 
stock holders will necessarily be rewarded by higher future yields from German 
producers is dubious. Although diversified quality production has served the 
German economy well it has never delivered above average returns of the 
magnitude which, for example, has induced venture capitalists to take a long-
term perspective in high-technology sectors. Nor is there evidence that the 
government would intervene to shore up the expensive German system of 
human resources development.  
 
The various points made above seriously question whether the various theses on 
hybridisation and/or functional conversion will continue to be useful for the 
analysis of developmental trends in the German variety of capitalism. The next 
section therefore will pose the case for convergence. To do so, I will identify the 
underlying pressures which will eventually destabilise the hybrid system and 
initiate more complete convergence, as well as pinpoint the developments 
which already indicate such a progressive trend.  
 
III.5 Pressures for system convergence 
 
As pointed out by Deeg (2001), the changes in the capital market now are so 
well established that they have become irreversible. They have created a new 
logic for corporate governance which will prove compelling in the longer run. 
This is all the more the case because these changes have been accepted and 
promoted by powerful internal actors – German commercial banks and the 
insurance company Allianz.  The gains from the switch to outsider control have 
amply compensated the large commercial banks for the progressive attenuation 
of insider control, and their interests now are firmly aligned with a stock market 
oriented economy (Becker 2001).  
 
Their enduringly powerful position in the German political economy makes it 
most likely that these financial institutions have been instrumental in nudging 
the Schroeder government towards support for system change. This has been 
evident in the reluctance to intervene to save Mannesmann from takeover 
(Heinze 2001). But more important, the introduction of the socalled Eichel law, 
which encourages the unravelling of the system of cross shareholding by non-
financial companies, has been passed without much debate. As the law only 
takes effect in 2002, nothing definite can be said on its impact at this moment in 
time. But it appears highly likely that the vast opportunities for gain, entailed by 
withdrawing poorly performing ownership stakes for utilisation in more 
lucrative investments, will be seized by both financial and non-financial firms. 
Indeed, both Deutsche Bank and Allianz already have signalled their intention 
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further transform the system of corporate governance, leading to de-
concentration of capital holdings, much increased stock market listing, new 
openings for foreign investment funds and hence to a market for corporate 
control. This would deal the death knell to the old-entrenched German system 
of cross shareholding and the system of insider control it has been upholding.  
 
Pressures for convergence have come not only from capital market actors, but 
the ideology and practice of shareholder value also have been more or less 
enthusiastically embraced by a significant group of company managers – those 
making strategic decisions in internationalised firms. Their positive stance 
towards the concept of shareholder value has been brought about by changes 
both in business culture and by new powerful incentive structures.  Processes of 
cultural diffusion have wrought changes in what is considered legitimate 
business behaviour and what serves to enhance managerial reputation. Changes 
in incentive structures mean that strategic managers’ interests are better served 
by a transformation of the German model of corporate governance.  
 
Although this transformation is not in the longer-run interest of labour, in the 
short run employees have not necessarily been averse to the new model as share 
ownership has been made widely available to employees at all levels of the firm 
(Becker 2001; Hoepner 2001).  This might at least partly explain the low degree 
of opposition from labour against the change in corporate governance 
introduced. The growing conflict between the goals of company-based 
industrial relations actors and unionists (Hoepner 2001), together with a 
pronounced weakening of organised labour during the last decade or so, also 
explains wide-spread acquiescence.  
 
Another powerful impetus for convergence, discussed in detail by O’Sullivan 
(2000) and hence not covered in this paper, comes from the crisis of the German 
pensions system and the increased likelihood of developing private schemes 
ensuring higher liquidity of funds. Such a development would boost the 
importance of  pension funds as prominent stock market actors on the Anglo-
America model and enlarge the German stock market. 
 
Last, pressures for convergence have existed for only a relatively short period of 
time, gaining momentum only during the late 1990s. If they have been able to 
unleash  fundamental change in so many areas in this short time span we must 
expect that many hitherto persistent features of the German variety of capitalism 
will be swept away during the coming decade.  
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The preceding theoretical analysis and empirical description of changes in the 
German model of corporate governance since the mid-1990s has considered 
both the nature and the outcomes of change. It has attempted to make evident 
the complexity of the change process and has explored the conditions which 
have to be fulfilled in order to diagnose either system reproduction or system 
convergence.  There has been a particular focus on how to conceptualise the 
role which the notions of institutional logic and of institutional coherence or 
complementarity play in our understanding of change, and the discussion also 
has problematised the notion of hybridisation.  
 
I have explored whether the outcome or direction of change in the German case 
can best be conceptualised as persistence of the model of coordinated market 
capitalism, as imminent convergence to the model of ‘liberal market’ 
capitalism, or whether the current state of affairs is best typified as a hybrid 
model, incorporating elements from both varieties of capitalism.  
 
The virtual consensus of previous analyses of the transformations in Germany 
has been that, despite much persistence of traditional ‘coordinated market’ 
features, change in the core area of corporate governance has been fundamental 
and that a new logic is in the process of establishing itself. Change has 
proceeded too far and is supported by too many powerful ‘within system’ actors 
to be reversible. However, in contrast to previous analysts, this paper has 
concluded that the typification of this process of change as hybridisation is 
unhelpful.  It can at most depict a temporary unstable stage of development. The 
new logic of corporate governance is beginning to  feed through into other 
sections of the economy - beyond the larger listed and highly internationalised 
firms - and to other institutional sub-systems, particularly to labour relations and 
utilisation and development of human resources. In this way, it eventually will 
lead to convergence with the Anglo-American model. Further development in 
the direction of convergence is not simply attributed to external constraints, but 
is shown to be receiving support from powerful actors within the German 
economy, particularly from large banks and insurance companies and from 
many of the large internationally oriented and listed German companies, but 
also from some politicians. Such internal support is explained in terms of 
change in both cultural orientations and incentive structures of these actors. 
Evidence in support of an emergent tendency towards convergence is drawn 
from an analysis of managerial behaviour in the vital area of strategic decision-
making.  
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converged towards the Anglo-American type. It has merely identified a 
developmental tendency and predicts an intensification of this tendency in the 
coming decades. My focus on convergence has not been based on any 
functionalist assumption of  a necessity to imitate the most successful economic 
model but on the belief that it would be dangerous to underestimate or ignore 
such tendencies. An important precipitating event here will be the 
implementation of the Eichel law and the likely dissolution of the cross 
shareholding system which has been at the very heart of the German variety of 
capitalism for more than a century. Such convergence will not entail the 
copying of all details of the model of liberal market capitalism, but the 
embracing of the underlying logic of shareholder value nevertheless will have a 
powerful transformative impact. on all relations within and between firms. A 
system of corporate governance does not have a determining impact but also 
depends to some degree on the values of those most centrally involved in its 
implementation and on the nature of the environment in which they have to 
operate (Deakin et al 2001). This implies that  shareholder value might be 
implemented in a manner more congruent with German institutionalised 
practices. Such implementation will, however, fall short of hybridisation and 
would be better described as a softening of the hard edges of the ‘liberal market’ 
model .  
 
Occurrence of convergence to liberal market  capitalism is not merely of 
theoretical interest. It will have far-reaching practical consequences, to the 
detriment of  employees and organised labour, as well as increasing the level of 
social inequality in German society.  It is, therefore, important to ask whether 
there are any powerful or influential supporters within Germany of the status 
quo who might be able to erect buffers between the capital market and labour 
and industrial relations.  
 
Here the arguments of  Hoepner (2001) and Beyer and Hassel (2002) carry 
particular weight. They point out that the production paradigm of diversified 
quality production is indispensable to German international competitiveness and 
that it is premised on  cooperative labour relations. The latter involves the 
continuation of active participation by labour in shaping company strategy and 
adherence to the high-wage/high skill model. The question thus becomes 
whether the proven importance of viewing labour as a stakeholder would result 
in the adoption of a model which can satisfy both international investors and 
labour.   
 
Hoepner (2001) and Beyer and Hassel (2002) plead for the evolution of a new 
stable system, combining two different logics which may nevertheless establish  
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two opposed logics can result in the establishment of complementarity and a 
stable system. My pessimism about evolving a new complementarity  is based 
on two arguments.  First, even the German managers who would like to 
preserve the old system and its values may either succumb to the powerful 
incentives of the ‘shareholder value’ idea and become seduced by the new 
opportunities for material enrichment they offer. Or they will be constrained to 
implement the shareholder value concept, even if they do not welcome it. Last, 
functional  conversion of the institutions of co-determination is not likely to 
save them as meaningful industrial relations entities. Although the structures 
may persist, their rationale will be changed fundamentally. They will no longer 
be an avenue through which labour may exert a significant amount of insider 
control - the feature which has long endowed the German variety of capitalism 
with its distinctive character.  Although the legal shell may remain in place for a 
while, the new capital market regulations and their pressures on top managers to 
conform to investors’ demands will transform co-determination mechanisms 
from encouraging labour participation in strategic decision-making to merely 
endorsing such management decisions.   
 
But the future is never as closed as my pessimistic prognosis makes it appear, 
and events may occur to halt or reverse the convergence process. Given the 
strength of cultural values and social institutional embeddedness of the ‘Rhine’ 
model, there may yet emerge a coalition of industrial managers, representatives 
of labour and politicians working for a new, as yet inchoate compromise 
solution. The present government owes its re-election to union support, and 
both cautious labour market reform and the 2002 Takeover Law are indicative 
of a stance trying to protect the old system. .  
At the present time, however, the emergence of such a macro level coalition 
cannot be detected.  - political leaders still send out mixed messages and 
confusing signals. At the micro level, continually shifting shorter-term alliances 
between investors, managers and labour are more notable (Hoepner 2001: 27).  
 
Alternatively, powerful external shocks and a sea change in the international 
business environment could reverse the convergence process. The ‘Enron’ 
syndrome has dented the faith in the US system of corporate governance, but it 
has not completely undermined it.  The passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
moreover, has already begun to restore investor confidence.  The only chance 
for a halting or reversal of the convergence process lies in a strong de-
legitimation of the Anglo-American system of corporate governance.  This 
might come about through the occurrence of deep world economic recession 
and the inability of the US economy to find a way out of it.   
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